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enterprises’ (MNEs) activities. MNEs have been differentiated into two types according to their 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the key factors behind the growth of global trade in recent decades is an increase 
in intermediate input as a result of the development of vertical production networks 
(Feensta, 1998). Manufacturing goods are no longer produced in a single country. 
Production processes are subdivided into several stages, in which respective countries 
specialize in producing parts and components. Many countries are involved in vertical 
production networks of producing just a single final good for consumers. 
 It is widely recognized that the production networks have formed due to the 
expansion of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) activities. Multinational enterprises 
have been differentiated into two types according to their production structure: 
horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. However, a new type of FDI which diverges from the 
vertical one has been proposed in the context of the recent expansion of more complex 
multinational activities; it is called export-platform FDI. Horizontal FDI maintain 
affiliates in home and host countries with the headquarters located in the home country, 
while vertical and export-platform FDI install affiliates in host countries with the 
headquarters located in the home country. The difference between vertical and 
export-platform FDI is where their products are sold: vertical FDI seek to sell their 
products in both the home and host country, while export-platform FDI seek to sell in a 
third market through the affiliates in the host country (Ekholm et al., 2007 and Matsuura 
and Hayakawa, 2008). 
 Theoretical research on MNEs has been conducted since the early 1960s 
(Hymer, 1976), but it developed dramatically from the mid 1980s as a result of the “new” 
trade theory. There are two important theoretical models of MNEs: one was presented 
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by Helpman (1984) and the other by Markusen (1984). Helpman’s model treats vertical 
MNEs with monopolistic competition and without trade costs. On the other hand, 
Markusen’s model treats horizontal MNEs with one factor, assuming firm-level scale 
economy. Markusen (1997) combines horizontal and vertical motives in a model, so the 
model allows two types of MNE to exist at the same time. This is called the “knowledge 
capital” model. Zhang and Markusen (1999) extended the model to consider vertical 
MNEs that supply intermediate inputs to a final production plant in a host country. 
While their models were constructed in a two-region framework, Ekholm et al. (2007) 
extended the model into a three-region framework to include export-platform FDI. 
Matsuura and Hayakawa (2008) pointed out that recent explorations of FDI theories 
have shifted from the two-region setting to the three-region setting (for example, Yeaple, 
2003 and Grossman et al., 2006). 
 Ekholm et al. (2007) and other models in the three-regional framework assume 
that skilled-labor-intensive intermediates are produced only at home, and the host 
country imports intermediate products and assembles final goods, combining 
intermediates and unskilled labor. However, those models do not adequately explain 
observed facts where some kinds of intermediate goods are produced in the host country. 
Our final goal is to extend Ekholm et al. (2007) to treat the procurement of 
intermediates from the host country in view of the present situation. We start from the 
simple model in the two-region framework in preparation for further extension. In this 
paper, we extend Zhang and Markusen (1999) to include horizontal and vertical FDI in 
the model with traded intermediates. There are no studies which treat vertical and 
horizontal FDI with traded intermediates at once, although more evolved models which 
treat vertical, horizontal and export-platform FDI with traded intermediates, such as 
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Ekholm et al. (2007), do exist. This paper serves to bridge the gap between Zhang and 
Markusen (1999) and Ekholm et al. (2007) in theoretical studies of FDI. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section 
introduces the assumptions of the model and model structure. Section three provides the 
numerical general equilibrium model, then section four presents the simulation results. 
Finally, our conclusions and future extension are presented in section five. 
 
 
2.  The Model 
 
2.1 Assumptions of the Model 
 
The following three assumptions are borrowed from Markusen (2002:129): 
 
1. Fragmentation: the location of knowledge based assets may be fragmented from 
production. Any incremental cost of supplying services of the asset to a single 
foreign plant versus the cost to a single domestic plant is small. 
2. Skilled-labor intensity: knowledge-based assets are skilled labor intensive relative 
to final production. 
3. Jointness: the services of knowledge based assets are (at least partially) joint 
(“public”) inputs into multiple production facilities. The added cost of a second 
plant is small compared to the cost of establishing a firm with local plant. 
 
Fragmentation and skilled-labor intensity motivate vertical MNEs, while jointness is 
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associated with horizontal MNEs. It should be noted that fragmentation and jointness 
are not the same thing. Fragmentation can be interpreted as service provided by skilled 
labor, such as manager service. Manager skill can be transferred easily by shifting a 
manager from home to host, but cannot be simultaneously used in both because a 
manager can only be in one place at any one time. On the other hand, jointness, which 
can be represented by a blueprint, can easily be shared among plants without reducing 
the services provided in other locations. 
 
2.2 Model Structure 
 
There are two identical countries, denoted by i and j, producing two final goods using 
two factors, unskilled labor L and skilled labor S. L and S are required in both sectors 
and are mobile between sectors, but are internationally immobile. 
 Y is produced with L and S using a Cobb-Douglas type constant return to scale 
technology and under perfect competition. Y will be used as numeraire and so its price 
is set to unity. The production function for Y is: 
 
 ௜ܻ ൌ ሺ ௜ܵ௒ሻఈሺܮ௜௒ሻଵିఈ,      (1) 
 
where ௜ܵ௒  and ܮ௜௒  are skilled and unskilled labor used in the Y sector in country i. 
Subscripts i and j will respectively be used to denote countries 1 and 2. Marginal 
products of S and L in Y production are: 
 
൰
ఈିଵ
 and ݌௜௅ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൬
ௌ೔
ೊ
௅೔
ೊ൰
ఈ
,    (2) 
 where ݌௜ௌ and ݌௜௅  are wages for skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. 
 Good X is produced with increasing returns to scale technology by imperfectly 
competitive Cournot firms. X is produced in two stages. In the first stage, the 
intermediate product M is produced only in country i using skilled labor S alone. In the 
second stage, X is assembled using unskilled labor and intermediate inputs M. There are 
both firm-level and plant-level scale economies. There are free entry and exit of the 
firms, and entering firms choose their “type.” There are six firm types, which are 
defined as follows: 
 
Type di: National firms that maintain a single plant, with headquarters in country i. 
 Type-di firms produce M and X in country i. Some X may or may not be 
exported to country j. 
Type hi: Horizontal MNEs that maintain plants in both countries, with headquarters 
located in country i. Type-hi firms produce M in country i, some of which is 
shipped to an assembly plant in country j. X is produced in both countries. 
Some of X may or may not be exported to country i. 
Type vi: Vertical MNEs that maintain a single plant, with headquarters in country i. 
Type-vi firms produce M in country i, which is then shipped to an assembly 
plant in country j. Some X may or may not be exported to country i. 
 
 Figure 1 shows an image of each type of firm in the case when i = 1. In each 
pattern, the headquarters of the firm is located in country 1. 
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Figure 1: Firm type 
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The model allows domestic and multinational firms to arise endogenously. The term 
“regime” will denote the set of firm types active in an equilibrium. 
 There are additional assumptions regarding factor-intensity from the view 
points of activities and firm types. The factor-intensity assumption in terms of activities 
is as follows: 
 [headquarters only] > [integrated X] > [plant only] > [Y]. 
 
In terms of firm types, the assumption is: 
 
 [type-h firms] > [type-v and type-d firms]. 
 
 Superscripts (k = d, v, h) will be used to designate a variable as referring to 
domestic firms, vertical MNEs, and horizontal MNEs, respectively. ௜ܰ௞ will indicate 
the number of type-k firms active in an equilibrium in country i. The cost structure of 
industry X is as follows: 
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ߠௌ Unit input requirement for factor S 
ߠெ
 Unit input requirement for intermediate input M 
௅ Unit input requirement for factor L 
ߠ
௑ Units of L required to ship one unit of X. This is paid by the exporting country. ߬
߬ெ  Units of L required to ship one unit of M. This is paid by the exporting country. 
G Plant-specific fixed cost in units of L required for the fixed costs of an X 
assembly plant, incurred in country i for type-d firms and type-h firms. Also, in 
country j for type-h and type-v firms, G is the same for any plant regardless of 
the type of firm and country. 
F Firm-specific fixed cost in units of S required for the fixed costs of an X 
assembly plant, incurred in country i regardless of the firm type, and in country 
j for type-h and type-v firms. ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௞  will be the skilled-labor requirement in 
the home or parent country, while ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௞  will be the skilled-labor 
requirement in the foreign or host country. 
 
 Markusen (2002:135) makes three other assumptions regarding fixed cost as 
follows. First, he assumes that skilled-labor requirements for a type-h firm are greater 
than (but less than double) the skilled-labor requirements of a type-d firm. This is the 
jointness assumption. Second, the additional skilled-labor requirements of a type-h firm 
over a type-d firm are incurred partly in the home country and partly in the host country. 
The last assumption is that managerial and coordination activities require some 
additional skilled labor in the parent country for a type-h firm. For a firm based in 
country i, the following relationship exists: 
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 Jointness: 2ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൐ ∑ ܨ௜௝
௛ ൐ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ
௝  and ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൐ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ . 
  Fragmentation is not perfect in that some costs are incurred in order to transfer 
technology. Therefore, type-v firms have higher skilled-labor requirements than type-d 
firms, but less than type-h firms: 
 
 Fragmentation: ∑ ܨ௜௝௛ ൐ ∑ ܨ௜௝௩ ൐ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ
௝௝ . 
 
 A specific example used in our numerical model is described below. The 
values are: 
 
 G=2, ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ =11, ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ =12 and ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ =4, ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ =9 and ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ =3. 
 
Total fixed cost requirements for firms are: 
 
 
type-d1 type-h1 type-v1 type-d2 type-h2 type-v2
L 1 2 2 -- -- 2 --
S 1 11 12 9 -- 4 3
L 2 -- 2 2 2 2 2
S 2 -- 4 3 11 12 9
 
The total fixed costs of type-d, type-h and type-v are 13, 20 and 14, respectively. 
 Next, the production costs of each type of firm are introduced. 
 
Type-d firms 
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Type-d firms produce three products: ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ , ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
ௗ , and ܯ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ . The 
skilled-labor requirements for type-d firms in country i are given by: 
 
 ௜ܵ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൌ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൅ ߠௌܯ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ  and ܯ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൌ ߠெ ∑ ௜ܺ௝
ௗ
௝ .  (3) 
 
The unskilled-labor requirements in country i are: 
 
 ܮ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൌ ܩ ൅ ߠ௅ ∑ ௜ܺ௝
ௗ
௝ ൅ ߬௑ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
ௗ .    (4) 
 
Therefore, the cost function of type-d firms is given by: 
 
 ݌௜ௌ ௜ܵ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൅ ݌௜
௅ܮ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ  
 ൌ ெ ൅ ݌ ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ ൅ ൛݌௜ௌߠௌߠெ ൅ ݌௜௅ሺߠ௅ ൅ ߬௑ሻൟ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
ௗ  ൫݌௜ௌߠௌߠ ௜௅ߠ௅൯ ௜ܺ௝
ௗ
   ൅൫݌௜ௌܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൅ ݌௜
௅ܩ൯.      (5) 
 
Type-h firms 
Type-h firms produce four products: ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ , ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ , ܯ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ , and ܯ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ . 
The skilled-labor requirements for type-h firms in country i are given by: 
 
 ௜ܵ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൌ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൅ ߠௌ ∑ ܯ௜௝
௛
௝  and ܯ௜௝௛ ൌ ߠெ ௜ܺ௝௛ .   (6) 
 
The unskilled-labor requirements in country i are: 
 
 ܮ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൌ ܩ ൅ ߠ௅ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൅ ߬ெܯ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ .    (7) 
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The skilled-labor requirements in country j are: 
 
 ௜ܵ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ ൌ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ .      (8) 
 
The unskilled-labor requirements in country j are: 
 
 ܮ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ ൌ ܩ ൅ ߠ௅ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ .      (9) 
 
Therefore, the cost function of type-h firms is given by: 
 
 ௛∑ ൫݌௝ௌ ௜ܵ௝ ൅ ݌௝௅ܮ௜௝௛ ൯௝  
 ൌ ெ ௅ ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൅ ൛൫݌௜
ௌߠௌ ൅ ݌௜
௅߬ெ൯ߠெ ൅ ݌௝
௅ߠ௅ൟ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛  ൫݌௜ௌߠௌߠ ൅ ݌௜௅ߠ ൯ܺ
   ൅∑ ൫݌௝ௌܨ௜௝௛ ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ൯௝ .      (10) 
 
Type-v firms 
Type-v firms produce three products: ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ , ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ , and ܯ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ . The 
skilled-labor requirements for type-v firms in country i are given by: 
 
 ௜ܵ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ ൌ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ ൅ ߠௌܯ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩  and ܯ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ ൌ ߠெ ∑ ௜ܺ௝
௩
௝ .  (11) 
 
The unskilled-labor requirements in country i are: 
 
 ܮ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ ൌ ߬ெܯ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ .      (12) 
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The skilled-labor requirements in country j are: 
 
 ௜ܵ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ ൌ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ .      (13) 
 
The unskilled-labor requirements in country j are: 
 
 ܮ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ ൌ ܩ ൅ ߠ௅ ∑ ௜ܺ௝
௩
௝ ൅ ߬௑ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ .    (14) 
 
Therefore, the cost function of type-v firms is given by: 
 
 ൅∑ ൫݌௝ௌ ௜ܵ௝௩ ݌௝௅ܮ௜௝௩ ൯௝  
 ൌ ெ ௑ሻൟ ௜ܺ௝ ௜ ሻ൛൫݌௜ௌߠௌ ൅ ݌௜௅߬ ൯ߠெ ൅ ݌௝௅ሺߠ௅ ൅ ߬ ሺ ୀ௝
௩  
   ൅൛൫݌௜ௌߠௌ ൅ ݌௜௅߬ெ൯ߠெ ൅ ݌௝௅ߠ௅ൟ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ ൅ ∑ ൫݌௝
ௌܨ௜௝
௩ ൅ ݌௝
௅ܩ൯௝ . (15) 
 
 Let ܵҧ௜ and ܮത௜ denote total factor endowments in country i. The factor market 
equilibrium can be defined by: 
 
 పܵഥ ൌ ௜ܵ௒ ൅ ௜ܰௗ ௜ܵ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൅ ∑ ൫ ௝ܰ
௛
௝ܵ௜
௛ ൅ ௝ܰ
௩
௝ܵ௜
௩൯௝ ,   (16) 
 
 ܮపഥ ൌ ܮ௜௒ ൅ ௜ܰௗܮ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൅ ∑ ൫ ௝ܰ
௛ܮ௝௜
௛ ൅ ௝ܰ
௩ܮ௝௜
௩ ൯௝ .   (17) 
 
 In an equilibrium, the X sector makes no profit, so country i’s national income 
denoted by ܳ௜ is: 
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 ܳ௜ ൌ ݌௜ௌ పܵഥ ൅ ݌௜௅ܮపഥ .      (18) 
 
 Let ௜ܺ஼ and ௜ܻ஼ denote the consumptions of X and Y in country i. The utility 
of a representative consumer in each country is assumed to be defined by the following 
Cobb-Douglas type function: 
 
 ௜ܷ ൌ ൫ ௜ܺ஼൯
ఉ
൫ ௜ܻ
஼൯
ଵିఉ
      (19) 
 
where, 
 
 ௜ܺ஼ ൌ ∑ ൫ ௝ܰௗ ௝ܺ௜ௗ ൅ ௝ܰ௛ ௝ܺ௜௛ ൅ ௝ܰ௩ ௝ܺ௜௩൯௝  and ௜ܻ஼ ൌ ௜ܻ. 
 
Maximizing utility subject to the income constraint, we obtain the first-order conditions 
that give demands for X and Y: 
 
 ݌௜௑ ௜ܺ஼ ൌ ߚܳ௜ and ௜ܻ஼ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܳ௜    (20) 
 
 An equilibrium in the X sector is determined by the pricing equation (marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost) and free entry conditions. The proportional markup of 
price over marginal cost is denoted by ߝ௜௝௞ . This can be read as the markup of a type-k 
firm in country j. The pricing equations of each type of firm are: 
 
 ݌௜௑൫1 െ ߝ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൯ ൑ ݌௜
ௌߠௌߠெ ൅ ݌௜
௅ߠ௅,    (21) 
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 ݌௜௑൫1 െ ߝ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
ௗ ൯ ൑ ݌௜
ௌߠௌߠெ ൅ ݌௜
௅ሺߠ௅ ൅ ߬௑ሻ,   (22) 
 
 ݌௜௑൫1 െ ߝ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൯ ൑ ݌௜
ௌߠௌߠெ ൅ ݌௜
௅ߠ௅,    (23) 
 
 ݌௜௑൫1 െ ߝ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ ൯ ൑ ݌௜
ௌߠௌߠெ ൅ ݌௜
௅߬ெߠெ ൅ ݌௝
௅ߠ௅,   (24) 
 
 ݌௜௑൫1 െ ߝ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ ൯ ൑ ݌௜
ௌߠௌߠெ ൅ ݌௜
௅߬ெߠெ ൅ ݌௝
௅ሺߠ௅ ൅ ߬௑ሻ,  (25) 
 
 ݌௜௑൫1 െ ߝ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ ൯ ൑ ݌௜
ௌߠௌߠெ ൅ ݌௜
௅߬ெߠெ ൅ ݌௝
௅ߠ௅.   (26) 
 
The optimal markup in a Cournot model with homogenous products is given by the 
firm’s share divided by the Marshallian price elasticity of demand in that market. Since 
Marshallian elasticity of demand is −1 in this model with Cobb-Douglas demand, a 
firm’s markup can be rewritten as: 
 
 ߝ௜௝௞ ൌ
௣ೕ
೉௑೔ೕ
ೖ
ఉொೕ
.       (27) 
 
Substituting the markup equations shown above into the pricing equations gives the 
following expressions for demand or output in terms of price: 
 
 ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ ൒ ߚܳ௜ ቈ
௣೔
೉ି௣೔
ೄఏೄఏಾି௣೔
ಽఏಽ
൫௣೔
೉൯
మ ቉,     (28) 
 
 ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
ௗ ൒ ߚܳ௝ ቈ
௣ೕ
೉ି௣೔
ೄఏೄఏಾି௣೔
ಽ൫ఏಽାఛ೉൯
ቀ௣ೕ
೉ቁ
మ ቉,    (29) 
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  ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൒ ߚܳ௜ ቈ
௣೔
೉ି௣೔
ೄఏೄఏಾି௣೔
ಽఏಽ
൫௣೔
೉൯
మ ቉,     (30) 
 
 ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛ ൒ ߚܳ௝ ቈ
௣ೕ
೉ି௣೔
ೄఏೄఏಾି௣೔
ಽఛಾఏಾି௣ೕ
ಽఏಽ
ቀ௣ೕ
೉ቁ
మ ቉,    (31) 
 
 ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩ ൒ ߚܳ௜ ቈ
௣೔
೉ି௣೔
ೄఏೄఏಾି௣೔
ಽఛಾఏಾି௣ೕ
ಽ൫ఏಽାఛ೉൯
൫௣೔
೉൯
మ ቉,   (32) 
 
 ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩ ൒ ߚܳ௝ ቈ
௣ೕ
೉ି௣೔
ೄఏೄఏಾି௣೔
ಽఛಾఏಾି௣ೕ
ಽఏಽ
ቀ௣ೕ
೉ቁ
మ ቉.    (33) 
 
 There are three zero profit conditions, corresponding to the three types of firms. 
Zero profit conditions can be given as the requirement that markup revenues are less 
than or equal to fixed costs: 
 
 ∑ ݌௝௑ߝ௜௝ௗ ௜ܺ௝ௗ ൑ ݌௜ௌܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൅ ݌௜
௅ܩ௝ ,     (34) 
 
 ∑ ݌௝௑ߝ௜௝௛ ௜ܺ௝௛ ൑ ∑ ൫݌௝ௌܨ௜௝௛ ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ൯௝௝ ,     (35) 
 
 ∑ ݌௝௑ߝ௜௝௩ ௜ܺ௝௩ ൑ ∑ ݌௝ௌܨ௜௝௩ ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ௝௝ .     (36) 
 
Using equations (28) through (33), the zero profit conditions (34) through (36) can be 
rewritten as: 
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 ൫݌௜௑ െ ݌௜ௌߠௌߠெ െ ݌௜௅ߠ௅൯ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
ௗ  
 ݌௜ௌߠ ݌௜௅ሺߠ௅ ൅ ߬௑ሻൟ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
ௗ  ൅൛݌௝௑ െ ௌߠெ െ
 ൑ ݌௜ௌܨ௜௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛ ൅ ݌௜
௅ܩ,      (37) 
 
 ௌ ெ ௅൫݌௜௑ െ ݌௜ௌߠ ߠ െ ݌௜௅ߠ ൯ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௛  
 ௝௑ ݌௜௅߬ெߠெ െ ݌௝௅ߠ௅൯ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௛  ൅൫݌ െ ݌௜ௌߠௌߠெ െ
 ൑ ∑ ൫݌௝ௌܨ௜௝௛ ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ൯௝ ,      (38) 
 
 ௌ ெ ெ ௑ሻൟ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ
௩  ൛݌௜௑ െ ݌௜ௌߠ ߠ െ ݌௜௅߬ெߠ െ ݌௝௅ሺߠ௅ ൅ ߬
 ௝௑ ௌ ௜௅߬ெߠெ െ ݌௝௅ߠ௅൯ ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ
௩  ൅൫݌ െ ݌௜ ߠௌߠெ െ ݌
 ൑ ∑ ݌௝ௌܨ௜௝௩ ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ௝ .      (39) 
 
 To summarize the X sector in the model, the twelve inequalities (28) through 
(33) are associated with the twelve output levels, and the six inequalities (37) through 
(39) are associated with the number of firms in each regime. Factor prices can be 
derived from factor-market-clearing conditions (16) and (17). Goods prices are obtained 
by equation (20). 
 
 
3. The Numerical General Equilibrium Model 
 
Markusen (2002) pointed out two difficulties in solving the model by comparative 
statics: one difficulty is the “many dimensions of the model” and the other is the “many 
inequalities of the model”. In this paper, we formulate the model as a complementarily 
problem following Markusen (2002). The program code for the general algebraic 
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modeling system (GAMS) is given in the Appendix1. 
 Table 1 shows the value used in the calibration of our model to the center of 
the Edgeworth box, where only type-h firms are active due to the high trade cost of 20%. 
Viewed in the column-wise direction, the table shows the input structure, while viewed 
in the row-wise direction, the table shows the output distributions. A zero column sum 
implies that the zero profit conditions are satisfied and a zero row sum indicates that the 
market-clearing conditions are satisfied. Positive entries are receipts, while negative 
entries are payments. All activity levels are one initially, except type-h activities. There 
are five type-h firms (2.5 for each type-h firm) at the initial point, so the markup is 20%. 
The fixed costs of other firm types are defined earlier in this paper. ߠௌ, ߠ௅ and ߠெ 
are exogenously determined as 1.0, 0.875 and 0.125. 
 
Table 1 Calibration of the model at the center of the Edgeworth box 
 
Y1 Y2 X11 X12 X22 X21 N1 N2 U1 U2 CONS1 CONS2 ENT1 ENT2 Rowsum
CY1 100 -100 0
CY2 100 -100 0
CX1 50 50 -100 0
CX2 50 50 -100 0
FC1 20 -20 0
FC2 20 -20 0
L1 -80 -35 -35 -2 -2 154 0
S1 -20 -5 -5 -12 -4 46 0
L2 -35 -35 -2 -2 154 0
S2 -5 -5 -4 -12 46 0
UTIL1 200 -200 0
UTIL2 200 -200 0
MK11 -10 10 0
MK12 -10 10 0
MK22 -10 10 0
MK21 -10 10 0
Colsum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CY Price of good Y Y Output of Y
CX Consumer price of X X Output of X by type-h firm
FC Price of fixed cost N Output of fixed cost for type-h firm
L Price of unskilled-labor U Welfare
S Price of skilled-labor CONS Income of representative consumer 
UTIL Price of a unit of utility ENT Income of the owner of type-h firms
MK Markup
Source : Markusen (2002), Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade , Massachusetts: MIT press, p. 161.
                                                  
1 Note that some solutions might not be found when one runs the presented program, which solves the 
model 361 times. Such kind of error occurs when the choice of initial values of variables becomes 
inadequate under certain conditions. One may solve the model individually by setting other initial values 
to recover the lost solutions. 
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 The elasticity of substitution Y is derived by calibration of the model, using the 
values in Table 1. 
 
 
4. Simulation Results 
 
Figures 2-5 present world Edgeworth boxes, where the vertical dimension is the total 
world endowment of S (skilled-labor) and the horizontal axis is the total world 
endowment of L (unskilled-labor). In the Edgeworth boxes, division of the world factor 
endowment between two countries is shown with country 1 measured from the 
southwest (SW) corner and country 2 measured from the northeast (NE) corner. The 
model is repeatedly solved for each cell 361 times, altering the distribution of factor 
endowments. Each cell of Figures 2-5 represents the equilibrium regime and the 
numbers inside the cell show which type of firm is active in the regime. Table 2 
presents the values we used to show which type of firm is active. For example, if the 
value in the cell is 101, it shows that the domestic and horizontal firms of country 1 are 
active. Also, number 110.01 shows that the domestic and vertical firms of country 1 and 
domestic firms of country 2 are active. Figures 2-5 are gradation-coded according to the 
active firm type. 
 
Table 2 Values for the firm type 
 
Country 1 Country 2
Domestic 100 10
Horizontal 1 0.1
Vertical 0.01 0.001
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 Figure 2 shows the equilibrium regime at 20% transportation cost of final good 
X and 20% of intermediate input M. This is the base case of our simulation analyses. 
The values shown in Table 1 are used to solve the model at the center of the Edgeworth 
box. The figure is read as follows: The center of the Edgeworth box, where countries 
are similar in size and in relative endowment, shows there are only type-h firms. The 
number 0.01 at the top-left corner of the figure means that there are only type-v1 firms, 
where 95% of world skilled-labor endowment and 5% unskilled-labor endowment are in 
country 1. At the edges of the box are the regions in which only type-v firms are active 
in each equilibrium. This means that type-v firms are active when countries differ in 
relative factor endowment. 
 
Figure 2 Equilibrium regime in the base case (߬௑ ൌ 0.2, ߬ெ ൌ 0.2) 
 
O2
0.95 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.000 MLY
0.90 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 100.010 101.01 101.01 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 100.000 100.000 100.001
0.85 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.000 101.000 101.000 100.000 100.001 100.001
0.80 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.000 101.000 101.000 101.000 100.000 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.75 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 1.000 101.000 101.000 101.000 100.100 100.100 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.70 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.000 JPN 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.100 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.65 100.010 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.100 1.100 101.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.100 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.60 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 11.000 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.101 100.101 100.001 100.001
0.55 CHN 101.010 11.010 11.010 11.000 11.000 11.000 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.100 100.101 100.101 100.001 100.101
0.50 10.010 10.010 11.010 11.010 11.000 11.000 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.100 100.101 100.101 100.001 100.001
0.45 11.010 10.010 11.010 11.010 11.000 11.000 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 100.100 100.100 100.100 100.101 100.101 10.101 10.001
0.40 10.010 10.010 11.010 11.010 11.000 11.100 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 100.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001
0.35 10.010 10.010 10.010 11.000 11.000 11.100 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001 10.001
0.30 10.010 10.010 10.010 11.000 11.000 11.100 11.100 11.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.25 10.010 10.010 10.010 11.000 11.000 10.100 10.100 10.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.20 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.000 10.100 10.100 10.100 10.100 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.15 10.010 10.010 10.000 10.100 10.100 10.100 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.10 10.010 10.000 10.000 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.001 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.05 10.000 10.000 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
O1 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
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 Figure 3 is the equilibrium regime when the trade costs of intermediate goods 
M are lowered from 20% to 1%. Figure 3 shows that type-h firms become a lot more 
important than in the base case. 
 
Figure 3 Equilibrium regime er  trade costs are lowered when int mediate
 (߬௑ ൌ 0.2, ߬ெ ൌ 0.01) 
 
O2
0.95 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.000 MLY
0.90 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 100.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 100.000 100.001 100.001
0.85 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.000 101.000 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.80 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.010 101.000 101.000 101.000 101.000 100.100 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.75 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 1.000 101.000 101.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.70 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.100 JPN 101.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.65 0.010 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.101 100.001 100.001
0.60 0.010 0.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.000 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 101.100 101.100 100.100 100.101 100.001 100.001
0.55 CHN 1.010 1.010 1.010 11.000 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 101.100 100.101 100.101 100.001 100.001
0.50 1.010 10.010 11.010 11.010 11.000 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 100.100 100.101 100.101 100.001 0.101
0.45 10.010 10.010 11.010 11.010 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 101.100 100.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001
0.40 10.010 10.010 11.010 11.000 11.100 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001
0.35 10.010 10.010 11.010 11.000 11.100 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.30 10.010 10.010 10.010 11.000 11.100 11.100 11.100 1.100 1.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.25 10.010 10.010 10.010 11.000 11.100 11.100 11.100 10.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.20 10.010 10.010 10.010 11.000 10.100 10.100 10.100 10.100 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.15 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.100 10.100 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.10 10.010 10.010 10.000 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.101 10.001 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.05 10.010 10.000 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
O1 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
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 Figure 4 is the equilibrium regime when the trade costs of final goods are lower 
than the base case. The result shows that multinational firms are going to be vertical 
firms (type-v). 
 
Figure 4 Equilibrium regime de costs of final goods are lowered  when the tra
 (߬௑ ൌ 0.01, ߬ெ ൌ 0.2) 
 
O2
0.95 100.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 MLY
0.90 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.000 100.001
0.85 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 110.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.80 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.75 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.70 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 JPN 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.65 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 110.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.60 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.55 CHN 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.50 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.000 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.45 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001
0.40 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001
0.35 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.001 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.30 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 110.001 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.25 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.20 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.15 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 110.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.10 10.010 10.000 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.05 10.000 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 10.001
O1 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
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 Finally, the case where the trade costs of both goods are lowered is examined. 
The result shows that Figure 4 and Figure 5 are almost the same. This means that ߬௑ is 
crucial for determining the operational pattern of firms. 
 
Figure 5 Equilibrium sts of both goods are lowered  when trade co
(߬௑ ൌ 0.01, ߬ெ ൌ 0.01) 
 
O2
0.95 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 MLY
0.90 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.85 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.80 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.75 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.70 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 100.010 JPN 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.65 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.60 0.010 0.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.55 CHN 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.50 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.000 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001
0.45 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001
0.40 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001
0.35 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.30 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.25 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 110.001 100.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.20 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 100.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.15 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 100.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.10 10.010 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.05 10.010 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 10.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
O1 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
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 Based on the above analyses, it can be said that horizontal MNEs are more 
likely to exist when countries are similar in size and in relative factor endowments. 
Vertical MNEs are more likely to exist when countries differ in relative factor 
endowments, and trade costs are positive. From the results of the simulation, lower 
trade costs of final goods and differences in factor intensity are the conditions for 
attracting vertical MNEs. 
 Overall, we have obtained some idea from the simulation analyses, but in order 
gain a deeper insight, we pick up three cells and examine those. We label these three 
21 
 
cells in the box as CHN (China), JPN (Japan), and MLY (Malaysia) according to their 
factor endowments relative to the United States. Note that the factor endowment of the 
United States is measured from the southwest corner, while that of the other labeled 
countries is measured from the northeast corner. The location of the labeled country is 
determined by the share of factor endowment. For example, the location of Japan is 
upper-right from the center, since Japan has a 40% share of unskilled labor and 30% 
share of skilled labor if there are only two countries, Japan and the United States, in the 
world. The locations of the other countries are determined in the same manner. 
 The value for the case of the US and China (CHN) in Figure 2 is 10.010, and 
the number means that type-v1 and -d2 firms arise in the equilibrium regime. Other than 
Figure 2, only type-v1 firms are active with lowering transportation cost for final or 
intermediate goods. In other words, type-d1 firms are crowded out by type-v1 firms. 
Type-v1 firms install their affiliates in China aiming at abundant unskilled labor. If a 
country like China with abundant unskilled labor wants to keep domestic firms (type dj), 
then the transportation cost for both goods needs to be high. 
 The value for the JPN cell in Figure 2 is 101.1, which means that there are 
type-d1, -h1, and -h2 firms. Type-d1 firms are crowded out and only type-h firms arise 
if the transportation cost for intermediate goods is lowered. On the other hand, if the 
transportation cost for final goods is lowered, then type-d1, -v1, and -d2 firms would be 
active. 
 MLY is located at the top-right corner of the figure and represents a small 
economy. From the fact that type-v1 firms arise only in Figures 3 and 5, it seems that 
lowering the trade costs of intermediate goods is crucial to whether the country can host 
affiliates for a small economy. 
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5. Concluding Remarks and Further Extension 
 
  In this paper, we examined which type of firm arises as a function of a 
country’s characteristics by extending the model presented by Zhang and Markusen 
(1999) using numerical general equilibrium analysis. The simulation results revealed 
that horizontal MNEs are more likely to exist when countries are similar in size and in 
relative factor endowments. Vertical MNEs are more likely to exist when countries 
differ in relative factor endowments, and trade costs are positive. Based on the results of 
the simulation, lower trade costs of final goods and differences in factor intensity are the 
condition for attracting vertical MNEs. 
 This study is not a pioneering work in the field of FDI theory, but will function 
as a bridge between traditional FDI under a two-region setting and the more recent FDI 
under a three-region framework. 
 So far, FDI theories under the three-region framework assume that only the 
home country produces intermediate goods. However, nowadays host countries produce 
some kinds of intermediate goods. The production networks for hard disk drives (HDD) 
are a good example to understand the present production networks among North and 
South, such as in the Asian region. We can observe a clear division of production of 
HDDs: relatively factor-intensive countries such as Japan and Taiwan produce parts and 
components, while unskilled-labor-intensive countries such as China assemble 
components. Also, even within the parts and components production of HDDs, 
sophisticated division of production has been occurring. In the production of HDDs, 
there are several key parts and components which greatly impact the quality of the final 
product and require much R&D investment, such as GMR heads, media, and spindle 
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motors. The media, for example, requires high technology as a whole, but the levels of 
technology required in each stage are slightly different from each other. As the first 
stage to produce media, a blank is cut from the material, and then the substrate is 
obtained by polishing the blank. Finally, the media is produced by spraying a magnetic 
layer onto the substrate. In the Asian region, the first step is done mainly in Japan, then 
the second stage in Malaysia and the final stage in China. Hummels and Uchida (2010) 
calculated this phenomenon quantitatively by using a vertical specialization index and 
showed that most of the countries in the Asian region except China engage more in 
parts and components production than in assembly in the vertical specialization chain. 
Ozeki (2010) also showed, using Surveys on Overseas’ Business Activities of Japanese 
multinational firms, that Japan’s affiliates procure more than 50% of intermediate inputs 
locally, followed by home (Japan) at 30%. 
 In view of the present situation in East Asia, in a future study we will extend 
Ekholm et al. (2007) to treat the procurement of intermediate goods from the host 
country, based on the model and program developed in this paper. 
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Appendix: Program Code 
 
$TITLE A 2-COUNTRY 2-SECTOR OLIGOPOLY MODEL OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL MNES 
 
SETS 
   I   /A,B/ 
   C   /1*19/; 
 
ALIAS (I,J,II),(C,R,RR); 
 
PARAMETERS 
   SE(I) 
/A  46 
 B  46/ 
 
   LE(I) 
/A 154 
 B 154/ 
 
   SY0(I) 
/A  20 
 B  20/ 
 
   LY0(I) 
/A  80 
 B  80/ 
 
   XC0(I) 
/A  80 
 B  80/ 
 
   XCV0(I) 
/A 100 
 B 100/; 
 
SCALARS 
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   THETA_S /1/ 
   THETA_M /.125/ 
   THETA_L /.875/ 
   TAU_X   /.20/ 
   TAU_M   /.01/ 
   G       /.80/ 
   UP      /0/; 
 
PARAMETER 
   FD(I) 
/A 4.4 
 B 4.4/; 
 
TABLE 
   FH(I,J) 
     A   B 
 A 4.8 1.6 
 B 1.6 4.8; 
 
TABLE 
   FV(I,J) 
     A   B 
 A 3.6 1.2 
 B 1.2 3.6; 
 
PARAMETERS 
   GSE,GLE,Y0(I),PX0(I),ALPHA(I),PHI(I),BETA(I),PSI(I); 
GSE= SUM(I,SE(I)); 
GLE= SUM(I,LE(I)); 
Y0(I)= SY0(I)+LY0(I); 
PX0(I)= XCV0(I)/XC0(I); 
ALPHA(I)= SY0(I)/Y0(I); 
PHI(I)= Y0(I)/(SY0(I)**ALPHA(I)*LY0(I)**(1-ALPHA(I))); 
BETA(I)= XCV0(I)/(XCV0(I)+Y0(I)); 
PSI(I)= (XC0(I)+Y0(I))/(XC0(I)**BETA(I)*Y0(I)**(1-BETA(I))); 
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OPTION DECIMALS= 8; 
DISPLAY 
   GSE,GLE,Y0,PX0,ALPHA,PHI,BETA,PSI; 
 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
   YC(I),Y(I),SY(I),LY(I),MU(I),XC(I),XD(I,J),XH(I,J),XV(I,J), 
   ND(I),NH(I),NV(I),LAMBDA(I),PS(I),PL(I),PY,PX(I); 
 
EQUATIONS 
   EQMU(I),EQY(I),EQSY(I),EQLY(I),EQXD(I,J),EQXH(I,J),EQXV(I,J), 
   EQND(I),EQNH(I),EQNV(I),EQLAMBDA(I),EQXC(I),EQYC(I),EQPS(I),EQPL(I), 
*   EQPY, 
   EQPX(I); 
 
EQMU(I).. 
   PHI(I)*SY(I)**ALPHA(I)*LY(I)**(1-ALPHA(I))-Y(I) =G= 0; 
EQY(I).. 
   MU(I)-PY =G= 0; 
EQSY(I).. 
   PS(I)-MU(I)*ALPHA(I)*PHI(I)*(SY(I)/LY(I))**(ALPHA(I)-1) =G= 0; 
EQLY(I).. 
   PL(I)-MU(I)*(1-ALPHA(I))*PHI(I)*(SY(I)/LY(I))**ALPHA(I) =G= 0; 
EQXD(I,J).. 
   XD(I,J)-BETA(J)*(PS(J)*SE(J)+PL(J)*LE(J)) 
   *(PX(J)-PS(I)*THETA_S*THETA_M-PL(I)*(THETA_L+TAU_X$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J)))) 
   /PX(J)**2 =G= 0; 
EQXH(I,J).. 
   XH(I,J)-BETA(J)*(PS(J)*SE(J)+PL(J)*LE(J)) 
   *(PX(J)-(PS(I)*THETA_S+PL(I)*TAU_M$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J)))*THETA_M 
   -PL(J)*THETA_L)/PX(J)**2 =G= 0; 
EQXV(I,J).. 
   XV(I,J)-BETA(J)*(PS(J)*SE(J)+PL(J)*LE(J)) 
   *(PX(J)-(PS(I)*THETA_S+PL(I)*TAU_M)*THETA_M 
   -SUM(II$(ORD(I) NE ORD(II)),PL(II))*(THETA_L+TAU_X$(ORD(I) EQ ORD(J)))) 
   /PX(J)**2 =G= 0; 
EQND(I).. 
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   PS(I)*FD(I)+PL(I)*G 
   -SUM(J,(PX(J)-PS(I)*THETA_S*THETA_M 
   -PL(I)*(THETA_L+TAU_X$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J)))) 
   *XD(I,J)) =G= 0; 
EQNH(I).. 
   SUM(J,PS(J)*FH(I,J)+PL(J)*G) 
   -SUM(J,(PX(J)-(PS(I)*THETA_S+PL(I)*TAU_M$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J)))*THETA_M 
   -PL(J)*THETA_L) 
   *XH(I,J)) =G= 0; 
EQNV(I).. 
   SUM(J,PS(J)*FV(I,J))+SUM(J$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J)),PL(J))*G 
   -SUM(J,(PX(J)-(PS(I)*THETA_S+PL(I)*TAU_M)*THETA_M 
   -SUM(II$(ORD(I) NE ORD(II)),PL(II))*(THETA_L+TAU_X$(ORD(I) EQ ORD(J)))) 
   *XV(I,J)) =G= 0; 
EQLAMBDA(I).. 
   PS(I)*SE(I)+PL(I)*LE(I)-PX(I)*XC(I)-PY*YC(I) =G= 0; 
EQXC(I).. 
   LAMBDA(I)*PX(I)-BETA(I)*PSI(I)*(XC(I)/YC(I))**(BETA(I)-1) =G= 0; 
EQYC(I).. 
   LAMBDA(I)*PY-(1-BETA(I))*PSI(I)*(XC(I)/YC(I))**BETA(I) =G= 0; 
EQPS(I).. 
   SE(I)-SY(I) 
   -ND(I)*(THETA_S*THETA_M*SUM(J,XD(I,J))+FD(I)) 
   -NH(I)*THETA_S*THETA_M*SUM(J,XH(I,J))-SUM(J,NH(J)*FH(J,I)) 
   -NV(I)*THETA_S*THETA_M*SUM(J,XV(I,J))-SUM(J,NV(J)*FV(J,I)) =G= 0; 
EQPL(I).. 
   LE(I)-LY(I) 
   -ND(I)*(SUM(J,(THETA_L+TAU_X$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J)))*XD(I,J))+G) 
   -NH(I)*TAU_M*THETA_M*SUM(J$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J)),XH(I,J)) 
   -SUM(J,NH(J)*(THETA_L*XH(J,I)+G)) 
   -NV(I)*TAU_M*THETA_M*SUM(J,XV(I,J)) 
   -SUM(J,NV(J)*(SUM(II,(THETA_L+TAU_X$(ORD(J) EQ ORD(II))) 
   *XV(J,II))+G)$(ORD(I) NE ORD(J))) =G= 0; 
*EQPY.. 
*   SUM(I,Y(I))-SUM(I,YC(I)) =G= 0; 
EQPX(I).. 
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   SUM(J,ND(J)*XD(J,I)+NH(J)*XH(J,I)+NV(J)*XV(J,I))-XC(I) =G= 0; 
 
YC.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; Y.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; SY.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; 
LY.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; MU.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; XC.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; 
XD.LO(I,J)= 1.00E-10; XH.LO(I,J)= 1.00E-10; XV.LO(I,J)= 1.00E-10; 
ND.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; NH.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; NV.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; 
LAMBDA.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; PS.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; PL.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; 
PX.LO(I)= 1.00E-10; 
 
YC.L(I)= Y0(I); 
Y.L(I)= Y0(I); 
SY.L(I)= SY0(I); 
LY.L(I)= LY0(I); 
MU.L(I)= 1; 
XC.L(I)= XC0(I); 
XD.L(I,J)= 0; 
XH.L(I,J)= XC0(I)/(2.5*2); 
XV.L(I,J)= 0; 
ND.L(I)= 0; 
NH.L(I)= 2.5; 
NV.L(I)= 0; 
LAMBDA.L(I)= (XC0(I)+Y0(I))/(LE(I)+SE(I)); 
PS.L(I)= 1; 
PL.L(I)= 1; 
PX.L(I)= PX0(I); 
 
PY.FX= 1; 
 
MODEL MNE_OHVM 
   /EQMU.MU,EQY.Y,EQSY.SY,EQLY.LY,EQXD.XD,EQXH.XH,EQXV.XV, 
    EQND.ND,EQNH.NH,EQNV.NV,EQLAMBDA.LAMBDA,EQXC.XC,EQYC.YC, 
    EQPS.PS,EQPL.PL, 
*    EQPY.PY, 
    EQPX.PX/; 
 
OPTIONS 
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   ITERLIM= 1.00E+08, 
   RESLIM= 1.00E+08, 
   LIMROW= 0, 
   LIMCOL= 0, 
   SOLPRINT= OFF, 
   MCP= PATH; 
 
PARAMETERS 
   NDA(R,C),NDB(R,C),NHA(R,C),NHB(R,C),NVA(R,C),NVB(R,C),REGIME(R,C); 
 
LOOP(C, 
LOOP(RR, 
LOOP(R$((1-UP)$(ORD(R) EQ ORD(RR))+UP$(ORD(R) EQ CARD(R)-ORD(RR)+1)), 
 
SE(I)= (GSE*(1-.05*ORD(R)))$(ORD(I) EQ 1) 
   +(GSE*.05*ORD(R))$(ORD(I) EQ 2); 
LE(I)= (GLE*.05*ORD(C))$(ORD(I) EQ 1) 
   +(GLE*(1-.05*ORD(C)))$(ORD(I) EQ 2); 
 
YC.L(I)= Y0(I); 
Y.L(I)= Y0(I); 
SY.L(I)= SY0(I); 
LY.L(I)= LY0(I); 
MU.L(I)= 1; 
XC.L(I)= XC0(I); 
XD.L(I,J)= 0; 
XH.L(I,J)= XC0(I)/(2.5*2); 
XV.L(I,J)= 0; 
ND.L(I)= 0; 
NH.L(I)= 2.5; 
NV.L(I)= 0; 
LAMBDA.L(I)= (XC0(I)+Y0(I))/(LE(I)+SE(I)); 
PS.L(I)= 1; 
PL.L(I)= 1; 
PX.L(I)= PX0(I); 
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SOLVE MNE_OHVM USING MCP; 
 
NDA(R,C)$(ND.L("A") GE 1.00E-02)= 100; 
NDB(R,C)$(ND.L("B") GE 1.00E-02)= 10; 
NHA(R,C)$(NH.L("A") GE 1.00E-02)= 1; 
NHB(R,C)$(NH.L("B") GE 1.00E-02)= .1; 
NVA(R,C)$(NV.L("A") GE 1.00E-02)= .01; 
NVB(R,C)$(NV.L("B") GE 1.00E-02)= .001; 
REGIME(R,C)= NDA(R,C)+NDB(R,C)+NHA(R,C)+NHB(R,C)+NVA(R,C)+NVB(R,C); 
 
); 
); 
IF(UP, UP=0; ELSE UP=1;); 
); 
 
DISPLAY 
   REGIME; 
